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Would the good employer please step 
forward? A discussion of the "good 
employer" concept in the State Sector Act 
1'9.88 
P·eter Boxall* 
The State Sector Act 1988 brings reuol.ut.io.nary change to public service personnel 
.management and industrial relations. Th.is paper analyzes the good employer 
principle co.nt.ai.ned i.n the Act (lgai.nst a backdrop of private and public sector 
thought in respect of ,good employment behaviour. The current .model of public 
sector personnel management is termed "accountable management" and it is 
arg.ued that any notion of the good e.mployer must be a "bounded" one. A set of 
assumptions .i.n terms of good employer attitudes is established, .explored .in terms of 
partic.ular processes and policies and a general public service pattern of employee 
relations is suggested. Finally, the problems of assessing chief executive 
performance under the Act are discussed. The argument is made that the bounded 
nature of the good employer principle .must be recognized in chief executive 
~appraisal ,as must the fact that worthwhile chang.e in employment relations is a 
long term endeavo.ur. The process of becoming a good employer .is never complete. 
1. Introduction 
The reforms of the fourth Labour Government (1984 -1990) in respect of state sector 
industrial relations and personnel management were, by any estimation, radical. The 
elimination of public service classifications, the notion of the unified career service, 
automatic wage linkages with the private sector and compulsory arbitration and their 
replacement with departmental (",enterprise-based") agreements and job concepts, 
collective bargaining and senior management contracts was, like the Public Service Act 
1912, an exercise in revolution not evolution (Martin, 1988, p.l). Coupled with 
Labour's corporatization and privatization programme and associated redundancies, the 
r~efot1ns of pay fixing and employment arrangements have been playing a major role in 
the drive to create a more efficient state sector which is congruent with the broader need to 
improve the competitive perfoi1nance of the New Zealand economy (Boston, 1987, 1988; 
Deane, 1989a, 1989b; Scott and Gorringe,1989; Harbridge and Walsh, 1989). Few 
revolutions, however, compl~etely repudiate the past. The notion of the "good employer" 
contained in section 56 of the State Sector .Act 1988 can be seen as an attempt to 
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maintain a link with the historic approaoll 
that tradition to be applied more flexibly 
While the statute is specific about certala 
(most notably the Equal Employment 
requires individual departments to put their -
customized employing philosophy within the 
consistent set of personnel policies. The ped 
must include an assessment of their perfot1nance as a 
of the senior executive service (SES) are expected to be 
effectiveness in this area (s.51). 
The function of this article is to offer an analysis of 
First, because existing legal notions are inadequate to d_,.M 
an attempt is made to provide an historical overviow of pdvate 
thought since the Industrial Revolution in respect of "good" 
Second, key phases in the public sector tradition are examined. tbese ftistQrieal 
sketches as a backdrop, some assumptions in respect of the good employer conoept are 
offered and the Act is explored in tetans of specific processes and policies. A geDeral 
pattern of public service employee relations is then suggested. Pinally, the article 
engages in a discussion of the problem of assessing chief executive perfOioutnce under the 
Act. 
2. Private sector management thought and the notion of the 
good employer 
While it is true that New Zealand courts, like courts elsewhere, have develo~ a 
concept of the "good and considerate" employer (Deeks and Boxall, 1989,p.l71) or Jood 
industrial practice" (Hughes, 1990, p.l929) in relation to the termination of employment. 
the role of the courts is not to establish a comprehensive theory of "SQOd" employment 
that can be applied by employers in the totality of their dealings With staff. The 
decisions of New Zealand courts provide at best partial and fragmoRIBiy assessmeDIS af 
employment practice. Similarly, industrial relations statutes which to 
the production of substantive employment codes frequently provide mach ia 
employment relations but, again, cannot be considered as being in the business of 
providing a complete framework in respect of the notion. We must linn to manasomont 
thought for anything approaching a satisfactory understanding of wbat it m a 
good employer and, here too, there are difficulties. Any attempt to define good employer 
behaviour involves value judgments as the State Sector Act recognizes when it 
that: 
... a "good employer" is an employer who operates a personnel policy 
containing provisions generally accepted as necessary for the fair and proper 
treatment of employees in all aspects of their employment... (s.56(2)) 
(emphasis added). 
Herein lies the challenge of this novel statute. Practitioners and the judiciary (If eYeJ 
called upon to do so) must interpret what is meant by "generally accepted as DeC3'S-.y for 
the fair and proper treatment of employees". How they might do this is the concern of 
this article. Behavioural science or industrial relations research is DO subsdtute for 
j ~ taking of certain philosophical positions although theoretical frameworb and 
· findings can assist managers to understand how employees think and feel and how 
actions and policies are likely to be received. At the end of the day, 
judgments must still be made. This means that there is plenty of room for 
argument. 
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Leadership in the common effort 
below. Progressive management 
intelligent cooperation in its 
accepted in the hope that they may play dJiir Jllll 
since unions must remain outsi~ the 
independence, since they must rent.ain a poJIBaaeat 
take the lead in this and they must, for the same 
assimilation to the managen1ent's purpose. 
Pluralism, of course, as Hyman (1978) noted, is an inlleteatly . , .. 
As Purcell (1987) has recently argued, fums that adopt what ~pea•s­
a pluralist approach can differ significantly in tlleir attiludes 10 QDic 
acknowledge unions but in what remains a fundamentany antagonistic way. 
to "emphasize dialogue, understanding and cooperation" (1987, p.S3S). The 
doctrine needs further analysis if it is to provide a framework useful to senior 
seeking an appropriate employment philosophy. Furthermore, as Purcell sugests, tbe 
whole Foxian distinction between unitarism and pluralism falls down on the fact that it 
treats these categories as mutually exclusive and fails to distinguish 
management's attitude to trade unions, on the one hand, and employees on the other. 
Human resource management 
Contemporary management thought in respect of the employment reladonship is 
increasingly dominated by the notions associated with the term "human resource 
management" (HRM). While some have simply adopted the HRM tern1 in a generic 
sense and therefore in a way that does not indicate how thinking has deparred from 
traditions, another line of argument (Beer et al., 1984; Boxall and Dowling, 1990) sees 
HRM as emphasising the need to take an investment-oriented and strategic approach to 
employment relations at the level of the enterprise. Emphasis is placed on the 
importance of developing human capital. The classical assumption of management 
accountancy in respect of expenditure on employees (i.e. that it is of a revenue rather tban 
a capital nature) is therefore challenged. The strategic approach calls for the development 
of a finn-specific human resource strategy which is integrated with sbategic 
worked out in the light of an array of stakeholder interests and critical environmental 
factors and expressed in a consistent set of policy signals. (Boxall, 1990a; Boxall and 
Dowling, 1990). It therefore seeks to draw human resource policies more fully into the 
realm of general management and draw general managers more fully into the development 
of human resource policies. 
As a framework for thinking about good employment behaviour, the HRM approach 
has 2 advantages over industrial pluralism. First, it has a much more sophisticated 
(though not unproblematic) grip on the relationship between product market sttategies 
and employee relations policies (Schuler and Jackson, 1987). Second, it stresses the 
importance of investment in human resources as well as the importance of building 
healthy industrial/human relations. In effect, it takes the position that the cmditional 
focus of industrial relations practice and scholarship- the establishment of employment 
"rules" that generate workforce "compliance" - is no longer a sufficient basis for 
management's needs or for analysis of the system. In the light of escalating 
competitiveness in product markets, the ascendancy of the knowledge-based and 
the demographic and attitudinal changes in the labour market, management · 
needs a framework which acknowledges the relevance of a more sophisticated set of goals 
- commitment, flexibility, innovation and the like (Beer et al., 1984; Guest, 1987; 
Boxall and Dowling, 1990). HRM offers much more specific help to practidoners in 
relation to issues such as skill formation and individual employee development and 
retention than can be found in the classical pluralist approach . 
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Before we leave this overview of private sector management thought, a general point 
must be made about all of these philosophies. To borrow a metaphor from Herbert 
Simon, they are all examples of "bounded" goodness. There is no notion of unbounded 
employer goodness in the private sector. Employers are not employers first and 
foremost, they are business people. This means that even the most benevolent employer 
(by whatever standard one applies) will at times have to resort to "hard" commercial 
decisions which lead, for example, to workforce reduction or a period of belt-tightening in 
wages and conditions. A good employer will weather a strike without caving in where it 
is important ttl do so (Purcell, 1981). By failing to take such decisions when they are 
called for, of course, the "good" employer runs the risk of losing the opportunity to be 
any sort of employer. The obvious lesson for individual employees is the need to take 
thought for one's own career development and what might be called "personal labour 
market strength". To rely exclusively on one employer's benevolence or restrict one's 
skill developm.ent .exclusively ttl skills valued by one finn would be very shortsighted. 
The argument that shall now be advanced in this paper is that unbounded goodness is 
also unrealistic in the public sector. Whatever the good employer concept means in the 
context of the contemporary New Zealand public sector it cannot mean some sort of 
undisciplined "warm fuzzy" notion. This, of course, is obvious to anyone who has lived 
through the r.estructuring of the last few years. 
3. Public sector trad·itions 
In respect of both Britain and New Zealand it is easy to identify 3 broad phases of 
thinking in relation to public sector personnel management and industrial relations. 
Again, the intention is not to describe these philosophies in depth but to point to the 
trend in thought. 
Historic patronage 
The earliest traditions of public sector personnel management were built around 
"offices" granted by the Crown, a system which lasted well into the eighteenth century 
(Fredman and Morris, 1989). In the UK, the dismantling of patronage is associated with 
the Northcote-Trev~elyan Report of 1853 which recommended competitive examinations at 
entry and promotion on merit ~(Wilenski, 1986; Fr·edman and Morris, 1989). In New 
Zealand, the watershed date is 1912 which saw the report of the Hunt Commission and 
the Public Service Act (Robertson, 1974; Deeks and Boxall, 1989). 
Weberian bureaucracy 
Patronage was replaced with the notion of a "salaried, permanent and politically 
neutral civil service" (Fredman and Morris, 1989, p.13) which grew to bear the hall.marks 
of a Weberian bureaucracy. 
In Australia, the Coombs report (1976) on government administration (quoted in 
Wilenski, 1986, p.203) defined the career seiVice as meaning: 
(a) recruiunent by merit (however defined and detennined) to a 
(b) unified service (intended to mitigate the evils which result from a fragmentary 
service) subject to 
(c) independent, non-political control of recruitment and of the conditions of 
employment; and where the rights of career public servants are protected by 
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(d) regulations which discourage the 
base grade, and by 
(e) legislated protection against arbibaay 
by due process). 
And exhibiting 
(f) a hierarchical structure of positions defmed by 
(g) a regular system of position classification of salaries (with incremeatal advaa ·,l"i"',, ..• , . .. 7 ~ 1 ~ .....-: •/ 
within the salary ranges of particular positions), with the ca•oer public -~ .... 
through this hierarchy of positions according to 
(h) a system of promotion by merit subject to 
(i) a system of appeals against promotions (designed to ensure that justice is seeD 18 be 
done)- the final reward for long and loyal service being 
G) a distinctive retirement and pension system. 
This description fits equally well the situation that prevailed in New Zealand from 
the Public Service Act1912 through the State Services Act 1962 and up to the refonns 
of the fourth Labour Government (Martin, 1988, p.13-14). However, the description 
does not completely define the model. To it must be added the elements of "fair 
relativity" in pay with respect to the private sector, a relatively consultative approach to 
industrial relations management in the context of compulsory arbitration, and state 
leadership in respect of equal pay and equal employment opportunity. That this son of 
system has broken down in the UK and New Zealand under the weight of a desire to 
streamline the public sector and a sustained critique of the presuppositions of the ca•eer 
service model is no longer news. 
Accountable management 
The new model adopted in the UK by the Thatcher administration and by the foUJ1h 
New Zealand Labour Government might conveniently be labelled "accountable 
management" to borrow a te1an first used by the Fulton Committee in the UK in 1968 
but not fleshed out comprehensively until the advent of the more competitive economic 
conditions of the 1980s with their concomitant pressure for public sector resttucturing. 
The notion of accountable management in the public service stands alongside a 
detennination to corporatize and, as far as possible, privatize state trading activities 
(Boston, 1987, 1988; Deane, 1989a, 1989b). Both strands of public sector refoiiil are 
designed to reduce excessive layers of administration and excess staffmg and pinpoint 
accountability for results in a way that improves the efficiency of the state sector. Chief 
executive and SES contracts under the State Sector Act are a prominent feab1re of the new 
"management culture". So is the power of the government to decline the 
recommendation of the State Services Commission in respect of a chief executive 
appointment (s.35), a power which has recently been exercised in relation to the Ministry 
of Defence (Boston, 1990). 
As in the private sector, then, the ascendancy of "accountable management" makes it 
clear that the good public sector employer must be regarded as exhibiting "bounded" 
goodness. Goodness is bounded by a concern to keep the size of the state within 
economically sustainable limits, to ensure it behaves commercially where it engages in 
commercial activity and to make executive accountability more readily manageable 
through the practice of negotiating specific perfo1n1ance agreements rather than 
subscribing to the notion of a "unified career service". This doesn't mean, of course, that 
individuals will be unable to develop powerful public service careers. The large 
organizations with significant job opportunities and the strong networks are still there. 
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However, public service careers will take on more of the characteristics of private sector 
careers - most notably, specific perfotnaance contracts, perfottnance-related pay and the 
need for individuals to take ultimate responsibility for their own employment security 
(through, for example, developing flexible skills and experience and a track record of 
respected achievements). 
4. The advent of the State Sector Act 1988 
The fourth Labour Government used 2 main legislative vehicles to advance its model of 
accountable management - the State-·Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986 (which 
corporatized certain state trading entities and laid the basis for subsequent privatization) 
and the State Sector Act 1988 which codified its new attitude to employment relations in 
the public service. 'The economic, political and ideological forces that paved the way for 
these refonns, along with a variety of perspectives on their desirability, have receiv~ed 
substantial attention (Boston, 1987, 1988; Brosnan and McCarthy, 1988.; Deane, 1989a, 
I989b; Deeks and'Boxall, 1989; Harbridge and Walsh, 1989; Martin., 1988, Mascarenhas, 
1988; Scott and Gorringe, 1989; Scott, Bushnell and Sallee, 1990; Walsh, 1989; Walsh 
and Fougere, 1989; Walsh and Wetzel, 1990). The intention of this article is not to 
review these works in depth. What is important, however, is to acknowledge first that 
the insupportable size of the fiscal deficit in New Zealand made reform of the state sector 
inevitable (Martin, 1988). Such reform was seen as essential within the broader context 
of economic restructuring and was targeted not only by Roger Douglas but also by David 
Lange and ~Geofffey Palmer (Boston, 1987). Second, certain ascendant ideological forces, 
principally Tr~easury's advocacy of public choice theory and the "new institutional" 
economics, provided this refo1 111 mandate with its characteristic shape (Boston., 1987; 
Martin, 1988; Scott and Gorringe, 1989; Scott et a/., 1990). Economic necessity and a 
gov~emment committed to acting on it ensured that r·efot 111 would take place. The nature 
of those reforms as they affected employment relations in the state - called here 
"accountable manage.ment" - are the outworking in legislation of ideas associated 
(primarily) with public choice and agency theory (this is made most explicit in Scott and 
Gorringe, 1989). The way in which the Labour Government pushed through these 
reforms without a robust consultative process has been described by Walsh (1989). 
Again, this is not the issue in this article although it clearly undermined the 
Government's credibility in terms of its own commitment to consultative management. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the implications of the good employer provisions 
as written into law. 
5. The good employer principle - an exploration 
Our task is to develop a theory of the good employer which operates within the 
context just outlined, observes the specific provisions of the Act and stands up as a 
coherent framework for management action. This is no easy matter. 
Assumptions 
The tensions embedded in the notion of bounded goodness are apparent in the Act. 
How are public sector managers to steer a course through this terrain? Before identifying 
important processes and policies, it is vital to make certain assumptions about "good 
employer attitudes". The Act itself does not set out explicit assumptions but any chief 
~executive who wishes to comply with it will find it difficult to do so unless able to work 
from some logically related principles. 
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Arguably, the State Sector Act rect • 
philosophy which simultaneously recopius 
Act is pluralistic in the sense tbat union 
and its integration within the Labour Relations Mt.l 
State Sector Act (naturally) goes much further dle 
specifying the way in which the Government expects its 
employment relations. Through its provisions for chief BBCI 
framework for the management of managers is insorred ill 11te Act 
concern for EEO, impartial selection and individual 
expectations in respect of individual treatment are aired. AU ill all, It 
the Act implies the following kind of assumptions: 
(a) Employees have legitimate interests which they define themselves. 
(b) To be a good employer, one must 
(i) seek to understand the interests of employees, 
(ii) recognize the right of employees to choose how to express their interests, 
(iii) seek to maximize one's common interests with employees, 
(iv) seek to resolve conflict of interest with employees in ways that me compatible with 
enterprise effectiveness and (as far as possible) the advancement of employee 
interests and 
(v) seek to take a long term "sttategic" approach to employment relations which is 
integrated with general management and expressed in a consistent set of policy 
signals. 
These assumptions, then, act as my response to s.56(2) - to the need to adopt a 
position on what is "generally accepted as necessary for the fair and proper treautlent of 
employees in all aspects of their employment". They enable me to integrate wbat is 
actually specified in the Act within the broader framework that is not made explicit but 
which the statute recognizes is necessary. Section 56(2) indicates that good enaployer 
behaviour should not be confined to a legalistic conformity with what is specified in the 
statute. Something greater (quite rightly) is required. Here, then, are the implications ef 
my assumptions and their relationship to the specific provisions cited in the AcL The 
analysis should make it clear that the Act provides chief executives with important areas 
of "strategic choice".~ 
Process and policy implications 
Internal communications First of all, this analysis is based on the view that 
employees define their own interests and decide how to express them. This means that 
the good employer must study the views of the employees and build strong internal 
communications. Regular team briefings and feedback sessions, joint consultative 
committees, workforce surveys, upward reporting on management perforn1ance, exit 
interviews and regular perfonnance appraisal and career development reviews are eumples 
of the sort of formal mechanisms employers use to give effect to this proposition 
(Rothwell 1990). Management training to improve informal interpersonal skills is also 
common. While none of these mechanisms is specified in the State Sector Act, it takes 
little effort to see that the general concept is strongly supported in contemporary 
employment practice (wibless, for example, the growth of team briefing in New Zealand 
manufacturing in recent years). To be good at employing, one must build strong, .,...... 
lines of communication with employees and avoid the making of inappropri• 
1 This article was completed prior to the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1'9t1 
and the repeal of the Labour Relations Act. 
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assumptions about what employees want. Naturally, the manifestations of this principle 
and the extent to which they are successful will vary. 
Union-management relations The philosophy outlined also means that the 
good employer recognizes the union or unions that their employees choose. Conversely, 
they respect the right of employees not to choose unionization. More generally, 
irrespective of whether labour law allows employees to choose their own bargaining 
agent, the good employer works within whatever legislative framework prevails to create 
a basis for mutual respect in management-union relations and supports the role of the 
union in giving voice to employee interests. The objective is to build what some have 
called "mature adversarialism" {Adams, 1989). Besides a positive approach to collective 
bargaining, this implies the development of joint consultation and joint problem solving 
to maximize shared interests and shared energies. It may well involve other fonns of 
joint decision-making that the parties deem appropriate. In contrast, immature 
adversarialism focuses only on conflict of interest and is characterized by rigid defence of 
"prerogatives" on the one hand and low trust responses on the other. One interpretation 
of post-refotan industrial relations patterns in the state sector generally is to suggest that 
while some state entities have made progress towards matur,e adversarialism, others have 
so far exhibited an immature style. 'The latter, seeking to distance themselves from what 
they regard as historically uncommercial industrial relations approaches, have not yet 
achieved a union-management felationship in which both conflict and cooperation play an 
appropriate role. 
The creation of joint working parties on such matters as new job evaluation and 
perfonnance appraisal systems is an example of good employment practice in the state. 
Of course, it must be remembered that the concept of "bounded goodness" outlined earlier 
implies that, like the union, management must "reserve" its position in certain matters 
and at certain times. The good employer cannot make an unreasonable commitment to a 
job or pay structur~e which has become inefficient or insupportable, for ~example. Thus, 
as indicated earlier, it is entirely possible that a good employer in the state will find it 
necessary to "draw a line" at some point and 1nay weather a strike over it. 
Staff development and work design When it comes to staff development and 
work design policy (which must be considered in tandem), the principles I have outlined 
imply that the good employer will seek to provide strong incentives to employee skill 
dev~elopment and will seek to maximize the intrinsic int~erest of work. This is based on 
the view that neither party has an interest in traditional job demarcations and skill-static 
Cafeers. If New Zealand business is to compete effectively in the globalized economy, a 
high skill path is likely to be far more effective than a low skill one (Callister, 1990). 
The public sector must mirror this approach and encourage it. The positive contribution 
of the state sector reforms in this context is the creation, by and large, of a single 
industrial document in each department. Such documents, as opposed to service-wide 
occupational classifications, enable the parties to adopt a more radical approach to work 
design and career path construction. The parties, of course., must respond to this freedom. 
A question mark must hang over the Act in terms of whether it provides sufficient 
incentive for them to do so. While the Act talks of "opportunities for the enhancement 
of the abilities of individual employees" [s.56(2)(e)], this is a weak expression of the 
skill fotanation imperative . It means that, under the statute, departments can be expected 
to vary substantially in the sophistication of their training and development policies. 
Having said that, the mere delivery of foa 1nal training and development programmes does 
not prov~e that worthwhile learning and skill formation has occurred. If chief executives 
are to be assessed adequately in this ar,ea, some sophisticated thinking will be required in 
tenus of appropriate m~easures. And, if the Act fails to stimulate an appropriate climate 
of lifelong learning that builds and sustains an excellent public service, it must be seen to 
have failed substantively. 
I . . . . . . 
... 
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It must be noted, in this context, however. 
importance of management development in respaet af 
critical that individual chief executives and the S1BtD 
forge the kind of relationship where there is an 
development within departments and across them. 1'llc • •'·>b,·,· .... ' • ~, 9 . • •• \. 
those experienced in multi-divisional companies whieh JIHista· ..... 1ktJJ 
talent for the sake of the group while simultaneously serving die lllllllaef 
executives. As Evans et al. put it (1989, pp.137-138): 
... a serious probleu1 for corporate human resource IIUIBaleJIICIDt is -
cooperation of local managers in identifying and releasma persODS wi~Jt 
potential. There is little natural incentive for them to do so: their most tale.Qted 
individuals will be creamed off by the corporation. disappearing into oiher 
subsidiaries or parts of the world ... 
Merit-based decision making, EEO and the partnership response In 
any notion of the good employer, individual personnel decisions (such as appointments 
and promotions) must be based on merit. In this sense, merit means the use of criteria 
which can be proved to be relevant to the effective performance of the position and Which 
are not based on untested assumptions. Untested assumptions frequently contain sex, race 
and disability bias and, in any event, are an uncommercial appr<?ach to personnel 
management. Of course, it should be recognized that some organizations use the merit 
principle to mean "suitability for a career" in the enterprise and do not restrict it to 
suitability to the specific position. The State Sector Act takes the latter course (see the 
wording in s.60) although it does require chief executives to ensure that all employees 
exhibit "concern for the public interest" (s. 56(3)). The issue can be dealt with, of 
course, by identifying certain generic departmental criteria and insetting them in all 
person specifications. One such generic criterion might be to do with the learning 
orientation of the candidate (in order to appoint only those who have the ability and 
motivation to keep learning). A focus solely on "merit for the specific position" mns the 
risk of being shortsighted and encouraging a static attitude to skill fotanation (which 
works against the dynamic approach advocated in the previous section). It increases the 
likelihood of redundancy rather than retraining where the position disappears in the course 
of technological change. 
Under this general heading, there is also a delicate set of issues for departments in 
regard to the balance between internal and external recruiting for positions above the base 
recruitment level. Obviously, organizations which always appoint "outsiders" to the top 
positions demoralize internal talent. At the other extreme, organizations which attempt 
to recruit only at the base level and promote strictly from within run the risk of creating a 
"clone-set" rather than a robust corporate culture - a problem recognized at IBM, for 
example (Evans et al., 1989). Somewhere, in between, a balance of policies must be 
struck that preserves incentives in the internal labour market but draws in outside talent 
where it can make an important contribution. The demise of the unified career service 
requires departments to find an appropriate balance in their context but there is no doubt 
that this will require some experimentation and soul searching. 
The merit principle must be recognized as an aspect of the EEO dimension which 
requires the identification and elimination of barriers (s.58) that perpetuate inequality aftd 
which implies specific measures to deal with particular employment requirements (such 
as childcare places). It must also be read in conjunction with the requirement in the ACt 
and in Te Urupare Rangapu for personnel policies that recognize the aims, aspirations aftd 
employment requirements of the Maori people and the need for greater involvement Of1be 
Maori people in the public service. This requires some sophisticated working __ 
issues and formulation of specific strategies in individual departmerlts. One 
practical implication is the development of recruitment procedures that ensure 
Boxall and Sisley (1990). 
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enables both union and management to buihl 
enable them to modify and redevelop 
perforn1ance criteria based on a careful prooeas of 
to 5 years but must then be subject to review. 
Finally, it should go without saying that .., 
decision should stand up to the scrutiny of 
respect of appointments, the Act requires each chief 
place (s.65). Although not specifically mentioned ia tile .Act.aar 
perfo1n1ance appraisal should be appealable through a 
the union. The objective of the good employer, of 
"due process" in these matters, but to eliminate the causes (fortt11• 1• -
and inequitable application of criteria) that give rise to them. 
Pay policies The Act is silent on pay policy except in so far as it empowem tilt 
State Services Commission to negotiate conditions of employment "in consaltarioa :wid~ 
the chief executive of each department affected" (s.68). While one would expeot M 
pattern bargaining across the public service in terms of the size of annual pay · 
this should not mask the important area of sttategic choice that exists in remnneratioa 
strategy. Remuneration theory has long argued that the good employer is one wllo seeks 
to pay those wages which are compatible with ente1p1ise effectiveness and nodOQS of 
fairness in respect of both internal and external labour markets (Annsbong and Murli&, 
1988; Brown, 1989). The former notion of fairness is typically known as "iniDI•aal 
equity" and rests on the development of an equitable job grading structure. Arguably, 
equity is most likely to be achieved where management and the union agree on a job 
evaluation process which has the twin aims of relating all jobs to a set of values whicb 
are both "commercially appropriate" and gender neuttal. To be effective, any job 
evaluation scheme should value those factors that underpin enterprise effectiveness.. 
Question marks must be raised over any "off-the-shelr' scheme in terms of the mes.qes 
embedded in its choice of compensatable factors and their weights (Lawler, 1986; 
1990). Does such a scheme, for example, place too much emphasis on "control over 
money and people" and fail to deal adequately with the intrinsic features of wmk altho 
senior levels of the public service? Is the model of organization implicit in it a "tall 
1950s manufacturing hierarchy" or a "flat 1990s service network"? The reforans have 
provided departments with the opportunity to develop their own system of inte.tnal 
equities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the quality of what has been done is variable. 
The second dimension of fairness is to do with the external labour market - typjcally 
known as "external competitiveness" or "external equity". This requires a methodology 
for linking the internal job sttucture to "the market". Of course, the notion of "the 
market" is far from straightforward (Rynes and Milkovich, 1986) and a variety of "policy 
lines" are possible in tenns of aligning the organization with "it". While a good 
employer may subscribe to one or more general salary surveys to gain mar.ket 
information, there is no substitute for conducting one's own data gathering in rela&ioa to 
the causes of recruitment and retention difficulties. Enterprise effectiveness may justify 
the payment of temporary market factor allowances to particular occupational group& 
This approach is preferable to solutions which underanine the integrity of either tbo job 
evaluation or the perfonnance appraisal system. 
There is, of course, a third dimension of fairness - "performance-based eqdy11 .. 
which has historically been important in the management of executives in the privatB 
sector (Boxall and Sisley, 1990). The public sector reforms have encouraged 
to develop perfotn1ance-related pay through the mechanism of "ranges of rates•. 
Perfonnance-related pay, where appropriate and where appropriately implemeated, 
improve both efficiency and equity. It does this primarily by requirin& the 
of perfotrnance goals or standards (often for the fii"St time) and structuring wmk 
around them. This can improve role clarity and motivation. It also allows 10081 
• 
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atttact and reward high perforaners and thus retain them and allows those with "broken 
service" or "outside experience" to be paid according to their contribution and not 
according to their seniority. The effort required to make "merit pay" work, however, 
should not be underestimated. It depends critically on management's commiunent to 
build and support a sophisticated perfonnance appraisal system (see above). Employees 
must perceive the proposed merit pay system, in terms of both design and 
implementation process, to be tundamentally more equitable than what it is attempting to 
replace. In some cases, a careful study of the particular issues and context will drive the 
organization towards skill-based pay or a mixture of perfonnance and skill-based pay. 
The state sector refo1 n1s have the virtue of allowing departments some freedom in what is 
usually an evolutionary process of experimentation. 
Because no pay structure lasts forever, what is important is that departments should 
build their own skills in respect of pay system design. In this area, a ttack record of 
consultation and healthy indusuial relations is vital to the ability to keep improving pay 
systems over time. Or to put it another way, process and policy cannot be separated with 
impunity. 
Em:ployment secur.ity The notion of the good ·employer contained in the 
original shape of the State Sector Act did not contain a commitment to job security. It 
envisaged the possibility of redundancies (s.66) and, subject to a suitable transfer within 
the public service not being possible, allowed for teuuination. Although that section of 
the Act has now been repealed, the public sector is characteriz·ed by a high level of 
insecurity. The notion of "a job for life" is clearly dead. Arguably, the challenge facing 
departments is one of creating a more dynamic concept of ~employment security rather 
than a return to a static notion of job security. The fundamental idea of employment 
security is to make a commitment to employees who are prepared to keep learning but 
not to make a commiunent to any particular job or job class. Even so, the commitment 
cannot exclude the possibility of redundancy but only relegate it to the status of the final 
option. The implications for employees of such a regime have been noted above. 
Occupational health and safety Finally, the Act makes specific provision for 
"good and safe working conditions" (s.56 (2)(a)). The provision of a safe system of 
work, of course, is an employer duty under any contract of employment (Deeks and 
Boxall, 1989) but employers vary in the care they invest in safety and occupational 
health. It is not controversial to suggest that a good employer should be in the vanguard 
in these respects. In the public service, one would expect to see measures to deal with 
the problems of "sick buildings", for example. One would also expect to see employees 
provided with access to independent advisory resources (such as chaplaincies and 
psychological services). 
G~eneral Framework 
A discussion of specific processes and policies always runs the risk that we won't be 
able to "see the wood for the trees". A typology, such as that outlined by Purcell and 
Gray (1986), is useful for identifying the general theme underpinning employee relations 
(where one .exists). 
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Figure 2: A typology of management " 
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Source: Purcell and Gray (1986); Purcell (1987). 
In this framework (figure 2 and table 1), individuali .. 
the fit an gives credence to the feelings and sentiments of t;&Cil 
each employee's capacity and role at work (Purcell, 1981. 
"concerns the extent to which the organization · dle 
a say in those aspects of management decision-making 
1987, p.538). II 
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but the "right of last say" 
with management. Emphasis 
is also placed on techniques 
designed to enhance individual 
employee commitment to tho 
firm and the need to change 
(share option schemes, profit 
sharing, briefing or cascade 
information systems, joint 
working parties, quality or 
productivity circles/councils). 
Constitutional Somewhat similar to the 
traditionalists in basic value 
structures but unions have 
been recognized for some 
time and accepted as inevitable. 
Employee relations policies 
centre on the need for stability, 
control and the institutional-
ization of conflict. 
Management prerogatives are 
defended through highly 
specific collective agreements 
and careful attention is paid to 
the administration of agreements 
at the point of production. The 
importance of management 
control is emphasized with 
the aim of minimising or 
neutralising union constraints 
on both operational (line) 
and strategic (corporate) 
management. 
Source: Purcell & Gray, 1986 
Single industry 
companies with m-
production or large batch 
producdon requiring a 
large unit size of 
operation. Labour costs 
fo1111 a significant 
proportion of total costs. 
Product market conditions 
are often highly 
• • compet1t1ve. 
Relatively lllolll 
emph•sis. on the 
central perBODnel 
auditing/control 
function. 
In teuns of the arguments outlined earlier, one would expect public service 
departments to seek a position that is broadly consistent with the "consultative" 
approach, that is one that attempts to accommodate both high concern for the individual 
and recognition of collective representation. However, as emphasized earlier and as 
recognized in table 1, such an approach will be bounded by efficiency considerations. It 
must be admitted that few public service departments will be able to marshall the 
resources associated with the most successful large scale private sector corporations who 
adopt this strategy. Pay levels, for example, are unlikely to match the private sector 
leaders. And, of course, it must be admitted that the leading private sector corporations 
who adopt this strategy are able to build it up comprehensively over a long period of 
time, largely irrespective of whatever political party is in power. This is obviously not 
the situation in the public sector. 
The other patterns shown in figure 1 are clearly inappropriate. The traditional style 
falls short of good employer attitudes. The constitutional style is indicative of much 
traditional industrial relations management in certain conflict-prone private 
industries (such as construction and transport). Great emphasis is placed on negodatial 
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industrial documents that are observed by "the other side" but often there is a lack of 
sophisticated thinking in respect of the behavioural implications of management style. It 
falls shon of a robust HRM approach where all signals to staff (including those embedded 
in any collective agreement and the manner of its negotiation and application) are 
carefully integrated. The sophisticated human relations approach has much in common 
with the consultative one. Many of the same destinations will be reached by both styles. 
However, the founer style must be discounted to the extent that it is not built on an 
acceptance of the right of employees to choose how to express their interests. 
6. The assessment of chief executive employment performance 
The principle of holding the .chief executive accountable for the quality of personnel 
management and industrial relations in an organization is a good one. This sends a 
messag~e about the importance of employment matters, helps to encourage the integration 
of such matters into the realm of general management and recognizes the role of chief 
executives in deteunining reporting levels, building an executive team, spearheading 
policy development and allocating resources. It recognizes a key premise in the theory of 
HRM. 
Having .said that, the demands placed upon chief executives by the .Act are awesome. 
On any reading, the Act requires the simultaneous achievement of effectiveness (in tet n1s 
of contracted outputs) and efficiency (in tenus of resource management) on the one hand 
and equity and integrity goals on the other (see s.35(12)). This is a tall order. As argued 
in this paper, it implies an understanding that the notion of the good employer is a 
"bounded" one. The State Sector Act must be regarded as a statute which contains both 
personnel management refonns and financial :management ones. As Walsh .and Fougere 
(1989, p.221) put it: 
The State Sector Act had dual pohcy objectives. On the one hand, it was 
intended to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the core state sector and 
thus help the Government r·ealise its public sector management policy 
objectives. On the other hand, the Act was intended as an instrument of fiscal 
management. It abolished the AGA and compulsory arbitration and eliminated 
block service-wide negotiations on conditions of employment. All workers 
were now required to negotiate pay and conditions in direct bargaining with 
employers. This made "hard budgets"' possible for the first time in the state 
S·ector ... 'II 
Any assessment of a chief executive's perfonuance as a good employer must take 
account, then, of "the need to take the hard decisions" where appropriate. The fourth 
Labour Government has engineered a reform of the state sector which has produced major 
redundancies and placed chief executives within a framework which recognizes diminished 
security and scarce resources. Whether this new framework brings about a stable and 
effective regime of employee relations in the public service is as much a test of the Act 
as it is of chief ex~ecutives. 
In my view, the critical test of chief executives is whether they can bring about a 
strategic approach to human resource management in their department This requires the 
building of a vision within senior management of the kind of employer the department 
can and should be., given its particular traditions, projected mission and the specific 
opportunities and problems it faces as an organization and an ~employer. This is easier 
said than done . It implies a sophisticated dialogue and debate within management itself 
in r~espect of alternative employment policies. It also implies a fierce commitment to 
draw the individual objectives and partial paradigms of particular managers and human 
resoufce specialists into a model of employer behaviour which exhibits a consistent set of 
themes. 'The refoiius of the public sector contain the potential for deparunents to "fire off 
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in all directions". Bringing the pieces t8piJIIII 
general management task. 
It is also important to realize that the 
attained their leadership as employers oveftliald. 
tenn endeavour that is ill-at-ease with the typieat foe'll 
reporting periods and short-tetln measures (Starey and 
executive on a 5 year contract to arrive at all 
simultaneously is unrealistic. However, it is reasonable 
of progress in the processes, programmes and relationships dtat 
The job itself will never be finished. 
7. Conclusions 
Economic necessity ensured that the fourth Labour GovemmeDt would 
sector management. In respect of public service personnel and 
relations, those refornas are primarily expressed in the State Sector Act 1918. 'fNdlill 
philosophical underpinnings in public choice theory and the new eccmeaca. 
the Act is an expression of "accountable management". The notion of the good emf(oyar 
contained in it must be understood as a bounded one. It is bounded by a conceiii to keep 
the size of the state within economically sustainable limits, to enswe it bollaves 
commercially where it engages in commercial activity and to make ·ve 
accountability more readily manageable. 
Under the Act, chief executives are required to behave as good employers. The Act 
provides chief executives with considerable sttategic choice in giving effect ro this 
requirement. It does not define the term in an exhaustive manner. Rather, secdon 56 
implies that it is the role of each chief executive to develop a customized employing 
philosophy or human resource strategy in their department. A legalistic implementation 
of only those items specified in the statute itself would fall short of this implicit 
standard. 
This article has pointed to a number of process and policy domains where chief 
executives must exercise strategic choice. Interesting questions include the extent to 
which chief executives will build strong direct communications with employees and the 
kind of relationships they will seek to build with unions. There are also issues relating 
to the way in which the merit principle is interpreted - whether in relation to the specific 
position applied for or in relation to a more dynamic career concept Similarly, there are 
questions relating to the balance between internal and external recruibnent and in relation 
to the development of recruitment procedures that uphold EEO principles without 
undermining the consistency of the selection process. Similarly, there is a substaRtial 
area of strategic choice in the area of pay policy. While the notion of compadbility 
between enterprise effectiveness and the "3 equities" (external, internal and perf0111l111Ce-
based) is easily subscribed to, its implementation involves significant choices and 
considerable determination. And, perhaps most importantly, the area of bainiDg aad 
development invites a wide variation of interpretation. To the extent that this repne of 
public sector personnel management fails to encourage vigorous skill f01mation, it might 
be argued that it fails substantively. 
Piecemeal perspectives on particular aspects of the employment relationsbip, of 
course, fall short of what is necessary to manage a modem workforce in a 
manner. Given the values implicit in the State Sector Act, one would expect to seewbat 
Purcell and Gray ( 1986) define as a general pattern of consultative manage•neat emergiag 
in the public service. The critical test of chief executives under this swutB is not 
whether they can push a little here or a little there on fashionable bat 
whether they can draw the pieces together into a coherent whole. Satisfactory on 
this criterion should be the primary test of chief executive performance UDder 
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Sophisticated HRM implies a commitment to building a vision of the kind of employer 
the department wishes to be and careful attention, over time, to the processes that will 
implement, review and reshape il 
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